Below is a list of questions to serve as a starting framework for the discussion in this thread:
- How to introduce dual or flexible citizenship to allow refugees to return to home countries without prejudicing their right to stay in host countries?
- How to help refugees maintain culture and identity of their home countries?
- What can be done by diaspora groups to combat youth radicalization?
- Share stories of success.
How to introduce dual or flexible citizenship to allow refugees to return to home countries without prejudicing their right to stay in host countries?
Dual citizenship is seen by some countries as a threat. However, for others, it is seen as a source of richness, and a must for some. This is a case more for the sending states than the hosts. Ethiopia, for example, doesn't allow for dual citizenship, yet because of the large percentage of the population who left during the war with the neighboring countries they developed the "Yello Card" or the origin card as an alternative to accepting dual citizenship without losing their population and their capacities. India is another example. On the other hand, you have the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which allowed for dual citizenship out of the necessity and the need for its diaspora member; Most of the refugees went to Europe and got the nationality of the countries hosted them. For the government to ban dual citizenship is a risk of losing the potentials of its diaspora members as many of them would not choose to let go of their new nationalities in favor of their original but new, fragile and out of conflict country.
Do you know of any other examples? Why did they do it? What about the host countries? Why do they refuse dual citizenships?
Hi Ashraf,
I think you make a really good point here. Dual or flexible citizenship is a feasible way to allow refugees to return to home countries without prejedicing the right to stay in their host countries. You asked why do some host countries refuse dual citizenship. Here's what I find:
Legal concerns: usually related to potential administrative conflicts caused by dual citzenship, concering military conscritpion and tax liability. For example, Eritrea has a flexible citzenship due to the war-time mobilization, but adult Eritreans overseas have been asked to pay a voluntary contribution equivalent to 2% of annual income. Diaspora may feel overburdened fiancially.
Socio-political and cultural concerns: multiple voting rights, the impact on "loyalty" and migrant networks.
Economic concern: whether integration is fostered or hampered by the acquisition of a second citizenship.
Does anyone know any of the specific examples regarding how dual citizenship helps the process of maintaining reciprocal ties between refugees and countries of origins?
Though from 2013, this Migration Policy Institute brief discusses how remittances and returns post-conflict by refugees can impact their home countries.
"Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict" - http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-diasporas-remittances-dev...
Thanks for sharing. Migration Policy has some resources!
Diaspora remittances can be public or private: publicly to the country or privately (i.e., personally) to immediate and extended family members [1] to provide for subsistence needs, health care, schooling, etc. [2][3]. Evidence suggests that private remittances cannot be used to finance conflict efforts [2]. The more public form of remittances is to the “known community” to either a city, a tribe, or group of people diaspora members know exist; or the largely public form of engagement with the ‘imagined community’ [1][3]. This is the type of remittances whom states should be concerned about [2]. Remittances are huge to some countries—for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) this figure reached 13% of the BiH GDP in 2015 [4].
Sources:
1- Nicholas, V. H. & Robin, C., 2015. Diasporas and conflict. Working Paper No. 122: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford.
2- Mohamoud, A. A., 2006. African Diaspora and Post-Conflict: Reconstruction in Africa, Copenhagen: DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.
3- Turner, M., 2008. Three Discourses on Diaspora and Peacebuilding. In: M. Pugh, N. Cooper & M. Turner, eds. Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding. s.l.:PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, pp. 173-190.
4- USAID, 2015. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Diaspora Engagement: Alliance for Agribusiness Development Fact Sheet, s.l.: USAID.